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The Changing Face of Mary Carter Agreements in
California: The Aftermath of Abbott Ford
and Proposition 51
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars have long predicted the demise of the Mary Carter
agreement,' the popular name for a sliding scale settlement agree-
ment.2 Despite such forecasts, the agreement has continued to sur-
vive. In California, however, it appears that the death knell for Mary
Carter may have finally been sounded. Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior
Court 3 and Proposition 514 together may prove to be the agreement's
biggest challenge in its fight for survival.
Abbott Ford is a clear victory for nonsettling defendants since most
1. See, e.g., Freedman, The Expected Demise of "Mary Carter": She Never Was
Well!, 633 INs. L.J. 602 (1975); Comment, Mary Carter Agreements: Unfair and Unnec-
essary, 32 Sw. L.J. 779 (1978). Many other law review articles have criticized the Mary
Carter agreement. See Bodine, The Case Against Guaranteed Verdict Agreements, 29
DEF. L.J. 233 (1980); McKay, Loan Agreement: A Settlement Device that Deserves
Close Scrutiny, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 231 (1976); Scoby, Loan Receipts and Guaranty
Agreements, 10 FORUM 1300 (1975); Note, Are Gallagher Covenants Unethical?: An
Analysis Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 863 (1977);
Comment, Gallagher Covenants, Mary Carter Agreements, and Loan Receipt Agree-
ments: Unsettling Contributions to Conflict Resolution, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 117 (1977);
Note, Mary Carter in Arkansas: Settlements, Secret Agreements, and Some Serious
Problems, 36 ARK. L. REV. 570 (1983); Comment, Blending Mary Carter's Colors: A
Tainted Covenant, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 266 (1977); Comment, Sliding Scale Agreements
and the Good Faith Requirement of Settlement Negotiation, 12 PAC. L.J. 121 (1980);
Note, The Mary Carter Agreement-Solving the Problems of Collusive Settlements in
Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393 (1974); Comment, Mary Carter Agreements:
A Viable Means of Settlement?, 14 TULSA L.J. 744 (1979); Note, "Mary Carter" Limita-
tion on Liability Agreements Between Adversary Parties: A Painted Lady is Exposed,
28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 988 (1974).
2. In some other jurisdictions, the sliding scale settlement agreement is referred
to by other names. In Arizona, this agreement is known as a Gallagher covenant
(named after Tucson v. Gallagher, 14 Ariz. App. 385, 483 P.2d 798 (1971)). One com-
mentator has used the term "guaranteed verdict agreements." See Bodine, The Case
Against Guaranteed Verdict Agreements, 29 DEF. L.J. 233 (1980). The term "loan re-
ceipt agreement" has commonly referred to sliding scale settlement agreements in
which a loan advance is part of the agreement. See McKay, Loan Agreement: A Settle-
ment Device that Deserves Close Scrutiny, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 231 (1976).
3. 43 Cal. 3d 858, 741 P.2d 124, 239 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1987).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West Supp. 1989) (Fair Reponsibility Act of
1986).
of the unfair advantages to settling parties have vanished,5 thereby
destroying many of the incentives to enter into the Mary Carter
agreement.6 Thus, while the agreement is still available, as a practi-
cal matter the agreement may be dead.
In addition to the effects of Abbott Ford, the Mary Carter agree-
ment is subject to Proposition 51 and its apportionment restrictions.
The result is unclear since no court, as of yet, has ruled on the appli-
cability of Proposition 51 to such agreements. However, the likely re-
sult will be that these contracts will be limited where noneconomic
damages are expected to be a significant portion of the awarded
damages. 7
This practicum recognizes the possibility that the Mary Carter
agreement will remain viable in California. To do so, the agreement
must be adapted to comply with recent changes in the law. Thus, a
new model agreement is presented which has adapted a standard
sliding scale agreement with several new provisions to recognize
these changes.
This practicum has three basic objectives: first, to examine the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court decision in Abbott Ford and determine its im-
pact on Mary Carter agreements; second, to look at Proposition 51
and predict how it will be applied to Mary Carter agreements; and
third, to provide a model sliding scale agreement which can serve as a
guide to practitioners.
Part II of this practicum serves to acquaint the reader with Mary
Carter agreements. Part III discusses the good faith standard in the
California statutes and its interpretation by Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Wood-
ward-Clyde & Associates.$ Part IV discusses Abbott Ford and looks at
its role in shaping the future of Mary Carter agreements. Part V in-
troduces Proposition 51 and discusses its probable effect on Mary
Carter agreements. Part VI concludes this practicum with a model
sliding scale agreement.
II. THE MARY CARTER AGREEMENT
The Mary Carter 9 agreement is a sliding scale settlement agree-
ment which is made between the plaintiff and one or more, but not
all, of the defendants. Section 877.5 of the California Civil Procedure
Code defines a sliding scale settlement as "an agreement or covenant
between a plaintiff or plaintiffs and one or more, but not all, alleged
5. See inkfra notes 56-i39 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 114-39 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 170-86 and accompanying text.
8. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
9. The term "Mary Carter" is from a Florida District Court of Appeal case,
Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), the first case to
examine this settlement device.
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tortfeasor defendants, which limits the liability of the agreeing
tortfeasor defendants to an amount which is dependent upon the
amount of recovery which the plaintiff is able to recover from the
nonagreeing defendant or defendants."' o
Mary Carter agreements typically involve three elements: (1) the
settling defendant guarantees the plaintiff a minimum recovery
whereby the settling defendant's liability decreases in proportion to
an increase in the liability of any nonsettling defendant; (2) the plain-
tiff agrees not to collect a judgment against the settling defendant;
and (3) the settling defendant remains in the action. 1 Some agree-
ments have a fourth element which provides that the agreement
must be kept secret.12
This device has many forms13 but is most commonly a device al-
lowing one or more defendants to make a guaranteed settlement. In
illustration, one defendant might guarantee a recovery amount (e.g.,
$300,000) to the plaintiff. If the Mary Carter agreement is made and
the judgment is less than the guaranteed recovery amount (e.g.,
$200,000), then the defendant must pay the difference between the
amount guaranteed and the amount of damages awarded ($300,000 -
$200,000, or $100,000). On the other hand, if the judgment award is
greater or equal to the amount guaranteed in the Mary Carter agree-
ment (e.g., $400,000), then the settling defendant has no liability. In
both cases, the nonsettling defendant pays the entire amount of the
judgment. This is the type of agreement most often falling under the
rubric of a Mary Carter agreement and is the subject of this
practicum.14
10. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West Supp. 1989).
11. See Note, It's a Mistake to Tolerate the Mary Carter Agreement, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 368, 369-70 (1987); Comment, California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 877,
8775, and 877.6: The Settlement Game in the Ballpark that Tech-Bilt, 13 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 823, 841-42 (1986); Note, The Mary Carter Agreement-Solving the Problems of
Collusive Settlements in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.- 1393, 1396-97 (1974).
12. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 720, 410 A.2d 1039, 1042
(1979); Vermont Union School Dist. 21 v. H.P. Cummings Constr. Co., 143 Vt. 416, 427,
469 A.2d 742, 748 (1983). California does not permit secrecy but mandates disclosure.
See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
13. Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 858, 870, 741 P.2d 124, 131, 239
Cal. Rptr. 626, 633 (1987). "[T]he number of variations of the so-called 'Mary Carter
Agreement' is limited only by the ingenuity of counsel and the willingness of the par-
ties to sign." Id. at 870 n.11, 741 P.2d at 131 n.11, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 633 n.11 (citing
Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)).
14. Another version of a sliding scale agreement may exist where the plaintiff
makes several different guarantees depending on the judgment. For example, a set-
tling defendant may promise a payment of $500,000 for any recovery under $100,000; a
payment of $400,000 for any recovery less than $200,000; and so on, until there is no
The Mary Carter agreement is very different from a traditional
settlement agreement. In the traditional settlement agreement, the
settling defendant pays the plaintiff a certain amount for the plain-
tiff's promise not to sue.15 Unlike the payments in the sliding scale
agreement, the payments of a traditional agreement are noncontin-
gent because they do not depend on the amount of judgment against
the nonsettling defendants.
Settlement agreements may combine -some aspects of traditional
agreements with sliding scale agreements, since a settlement may
consist of both noncontingent payments and sliding scale payments.
These are hybrid Mary Carter agreements rather than pure Mary
Carter agreements. 16 For example, the settling defendant may prom-
ise the plaintiff $200,000 regardless of the recovery, and also guaran-
tee a recovery of $500,000. As will be shown, pure sliding scale
agreements where noneconomic damages are sought may be effec-
tively eliminated by Proposition 51. Thus, pure sliding scale agree-
ments after Proposition 51 will be rare.17
Mary Carter agreements have been subject to much criticism.18
Originally, the Mary Carter agreement was secretive as it was made
without the knowledge of the nonsettling defendant.19 This led to
many problems. The agreement, for example, was a vehicle for collu-
sion or ganging up on one or more defendants.2o California corrected
this problem by enacting section 877.5 of the California Civil Proce-
dure Code.21 Subsection 877.5(c) requires disclosure to all parties:
"No sliding scale recovery agreement is effective unless a notice of
intent to enter into an agreement has been served on all non-
signatory alleged defendant tortfeasors." 22
payment if the recovery reaches $600,000. In essence, this agreement is like the typical
sliding scale guarantee except that payments step down for each $100,000 of recovery.
The payments of this agreement are incremented in a step-like fashion rather than in
the linear manner of a typical sliding scale agreement. See Model Agreement, para. 2,
alternative B in Appendix of this practicum.
15. See Note, It's a Mistake to Tolerate the Mary Carter Agreement, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 368, 371 (1987) [hereinafter It's a Mistake].
16. A hybrid agreement was used in Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App.
3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981). In Dompeling, the settling defendant promised
$100,000 and possible additional payments up to $10,000 to plaintiff depending upon
plaintiff's recovery from the nonsettling defendant. Id. at 802, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
Similarly, in Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d. 499, 503, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825,
828 (1984), the settling defendant made a noncontingent payment of $50,000 and pro-
vided an additional $150,000 guarantee on a sliding scale basis.
17. But see infra note 188.
18. See supra note 1.
19. See It's a Mistake, supra note 15, at 370 & nn.10-11.
20. Note, The Mary Carter Agreement-Solving the Problems of Collusive Settle-
ments in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1398-1403 (1974) [hereinafter Col-
lusive Settlements].
21. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West Supp. 1989).
22. Id § 877.5(c).
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Additionally, the agreement was unfair to the nonsettling defend-
ant at trial since the settling defendants favored the plaintiff rather
than their co-defendant. 23 Subsection 877.5(a)(2) diminishes this un-
fairness to the nonsettling defendant in a jury trial by disclosing the
existence and the content of such agreement to the jury.24 Thus, the
jury will be aware of any bias the settling defendant has against any
nonsettling defendant.
Although California has improved the fairness of Mary Carter
agreements, such agreements may still be unfair to nonsettling de-
fendants.25 Critics view the agreement as harsh since settling de-
fendants may have no liability and consequently subject the
nonsettling defendants to the entire judgment.26 The good faith re-
quirement in California has attempted to remedy this unfairness.
III. THE GOOD FAITH STANDARD
A. Competing Policies of Equitable Apportionment and Settlement
Two policies should be considered whenever a Mary Carter agree-
ment is entered-apportionment of damages equitably among defend-
ants and encouragement of settlements.27 Equitable apportionment
of damages is necessary to uphold fairness to the parties and to keep
certain parties from being unduly punished. At the same time, settle-
ments encourage parties to resolve their own disputes, avoid expen-
sive and time consuming litigation, and keep the court's docket
moving. However, there is a potential conflict between these two
policies when multiple defendants are involved.28
23. Collusive Settlements, supra note 20, at 1400.
24. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.5(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989). This section provides:
If the action is tried before a jury, and a defendant party to the agreement is
called as a witness at trial, the court shall, upon motion of a party, disclose to
the jury the existence and content of the agreement or covenant, unless the
court finds that such disclosure will create substantial danger of undue preju-
dice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.
Id.
25. See inkfra text accompanying notes 79-84 discussing problems of equitable
apportionment.
26. This has changed after Abbott Ford. See Abbott Ford Inc., v. Superior Court,
43 Cal. 3d 858, 885 n.27, 741 P.2d 124, 142 n.27, 239 Cal. Rptr. 626, 644 n.27 (1987). The
nonsettling defendant now receives an offset for the value of the sliding scale agree-
ment. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877(b) (West Supp. 1989).
27. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 872, 741 P.2d at 133, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 635. See also
Comment, California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 877, 87Z5 and 877.6: The Settle-
ment Game in the Ballpark that Tech-Bilt, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 823, 823-29 (1986).
28. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 807-08, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 43
(1981). In Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980), the
This tension can be illustrated as follows. Where a Mary Carter
agreement permits a defendant to escape liability, the defendant will
be encouraged to settle;29 and where the plaintiff receives a guaran-
tee without forfeiting anything, the plaintiff is encouraged to settle.30
Thus, left unregulated, the Mary Carter agreement is an attractive
settlement vehicle. However, the unfairness is that a nonsettling de-
fendant is liable for the entire judgment.31 Thus, the traditional
Mary Carter agreement encourages settlement at the expense of fair
apportionment among all defendants. California has attempted to
balance these two goals by enacting a statutory good faith
requirement.3 2
B. California Civil Procedure Code Sections 877 and 877.6
California's good faith requirement under section 877 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Procedure CodeS3 mandates that courts review Mary
court announced a priority of interests. The court stated: "The relevant public policy
considerations underlying multiparty tort litigation in decreasing order of priority are:
(1) the maximization of recovery to the injured party, (2) settlement of the injured
party's claim, and (3) equitable apportionment of liability among concurrent
tortfeasors ...... Id at 447, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 56 (quoting American Bankers Ins. Co. v.
Avco-Lycoming Div., 97 Cal. App. 3d 732, 736, 159 Cal. Rptr. 70, 73 (1979)).
29. The Mary Carter agreement has several attractive features to the settling de-
fendant. First, the guarantee amount acts as a ceiling on the liability. Thus, the set-
tling defendant will not be liable for any amounts beyond the guarantee amount. This
may allow use of a liability insurance policy to make a guarantee up to the policy lim-
its and have no personal liability. Second, the settling defendant will have no liability
if the guarantee amount is less than the judgment. The settling defendant is liable for
only the excess between the guarantee amount and the judgment. See Comment, Slid-
ing Scale Settlements: The Need for a Minimum Contribution to Comply with the Rea-
sonable Range Test for Good Faith, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 995, 1020-21 (1986) (discussion
of costs and benefits of sliding scale settlements) [hereinafter Sliding Scale].
30. The view in California prior to Abbott Ford was that there was no considera-
tion since the settling defendant could have no liability. See Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at
885 n.27, 741 P.2d at 142 n.27, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 644 n.27. See Sliding Scale, supra note
29 at 1020-21 (costs and benefits of sliding scale settlements).
31. Before Abbott Ford was decided in 1987, the nonsettling defendant was subject
to the entire judgment and did not have the right of contribution or equitable indem-
nity. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1989). It was not clear whether
there remained a potential total indemnity action. See Comment, Total Equitable In-
demnity Under Comparative Negligence: Anomaly or Necessity?, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1057, 1057-58 (1986). See also Sliding Scale, supra note 29, at 1021 (cost of sliding scale
settlements).
32. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1989). See also Tech-Bilt, Inc. v.
Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d. 488, 494, 698 P.2d 159, 163, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256,
260 (1985) (discussion of what constitutes good faith).
33. Section 877 states:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue
or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to
one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort,
or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution rights, it
shall have the following effect:
(a) It shall not discharge any other such party from liability unless its terms
so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount
[Vol. 16: 795, 1989] Mary Carter Agreements
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Carter agreements to ensure that such settlements appropriately bal-
ance these dual objectives.3 4 Where the agreement is found to have
been entered into in good faith, section 877 provides that the settling
party will be discharged of all liability for contribution. 35 Thus,
where the good faith standard has not been met, the settling defend-
ant may be subject to a contribution action which would thwart the
purpose of a Mary Carter agreement.36 Another important provision
under section 877 is that the plaintiff's claim against the nonsettling
defendants will be reduced by the amount of consideration or the
amount stipulated in the agreement if greater.3 7
Under section 877.6 of the California Civil Procedure Code, any
party to the suit may move for a hearing to determine the good faith
of the settlement.38 As there is no statutory definition of good faith,
parties must look to the courts for evaluation of their agreement. In
stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of
the consideration paid for it whichever is the greater.
(b) It shall discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any
contribution to any other parties.
(c) This section shall not apply to co-obligors who have expressly agreed in
writing to an apportionment of liability for losses or claims among themselves.
(d) This section shall not apply to a release, dismissal with or without preju-
dice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment given to a co-obligor
on an alleged contract debt where the contract was made prior to January 1,
1988.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1989).
34. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 494, 698 P.2d at 163, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
35. Id. § 877(b) (West Supp. 1989). The principle of contribution allows a
tortfeasor against whom a judgment is executed to recover an appropriate proportion
of the judgment from other liable joint tortfeasors whose negligence contributed to the
injury. Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
36. If the good faith standard is not met, the agreement may still be valid between
the plaintiff and the nonsettling defendant. However, the statutory benefit of no con-
tribution to the settling defendant is lost. Therefore, the parties should stipulate in
the agreement as to what should happen in that event.
37. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West Supp. 1989). This reduction is more fully
discussed in infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
38. The pertinent text of section 877.6 is as follows:
(a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are
joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing
on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or
other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors, upon giving
notice thereof ....
(b) The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the
court on the basis of affidavits served with the notice of hearing, and any
counteraffidavits filed in response thereto, or the court may, in its discretion,
receive other evidence at the hearing.
(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims
against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contri-
Tech-Bilt, the California Supreme Court set guidelines to determine
whether good faith exists as defined in section 877.39
C. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates
Prior to Tech-Bilt, the meaning of good faith as applied to settle-
ment agreements in section 877 was unsettled. The California appel-
late courts made conflicting interpretations of this good faith
standard. Two prominent views emerged. Under Dompeling v. Supe-
rior Court, good faith was found if there was no tortious conduct.40
In River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court,41 the view was ex-
pressed that a settlement was made in good faith if the settlement
amount was within a reasonable range of the settling defendant's fair
share of damages.42
In Tech-Bilt, the California Supreme Court resolved the conflict.43
The supreme court rejected the view that a settlement is in good
faith unless it arises from tortious conduct.4 4 Instead, it adopted an
bution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence
or comparative fault.
(d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof
on that issue.
(e) When a determination of the good faith or lack of good faith of a settle-
ment is made, any party aggrieved by the determination may petition the
proper court to review the determination by writ of mandate ....
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1989).
39. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213
Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
40. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 45 (1981). The court stated its
view of good faith as follows: "The settling parties owe the nonsettling defendants a
legal duty to refrain from tortious or other wrongful conduct; absent conduct violative
of such duty, the settling parties may act to further their respective interests without
regard to the effect of their settlement upon other defendants." Id. The court gave an
example of bad faith: "An agreement between the settling defendant and plaintiff, in
settling for a disproportionate amount, to aid plaintiff's case by committing perjury
...... I&L at 810 n.7, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45 n.7.
41. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
42. Id. at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
43. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). The facts in Tech-Bilt
are as follows: Plaintiffs, Mr. & Mrs. Fabula owned residential property. Plaintiffs
brought an action against Tech-Bilt (developer), Woodward-Clyde (soils engineer), and
others to recover damages for structural defects in their residence. Woodward-Clyde's
services were performed more than 10 years earlier and were barred under the appli-
cable statute of limitations. Woodward-Clyde and plaintiffs agreed that the action
against Woodward-Clyde would be dropped and they would waive any claim against
plaintiffs for the costs of defending the action. Tech-Bilt brought a cross-claim against
Woodward for indemnity and declaratory relief. Woodward then moved for a good
faith hearing. The lower court found the agreement in good faith within the meaning
of section 877.6 of the California Civil Procedure Code and consequently dismissed the
cross-complaint. Id at 492, 698 P.2d at 161, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
44. The court reasoned that the Dompeling "tortious conduct" test is capable of
"harsh results." Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 498, 698 P.2d at 165, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 262. The
court cited Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr.
254 (1981) as an example. In Cardio Systems, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice
and products liability action after the decedent had died on an operating table for al-
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analysis similar to the reasonable range test in River Garden Farms.
The reasonable range used in Tech-Bilt has become more popularly
known as the Tech-Bilt "ballpark."45
Under the Tech-Bilt test, good faith is determined by considering
several factors. Recognizing the importance of proportionality, the
court articulated that a "definition of 'good faith,' . . . [should allow]
the trial court to inquire ... whether the amount of the settlement is
within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional
share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries."46 However,
the court noted that bad faith will not necessarily be "established by
a showing that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical pro-
portionate or fair share. ' 4
7
Another important factor which the court recognized is that a set-
tling defendant "should pay less in settlement than he would if he
were found liable after a trial."48 Also, the court may look at the fi-
nancial condition and insurance policy limits of settling defendants,49
and at any possible collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct intended to
harm nonsettling defendants' interests.5 0
Practical considerations dictate that the evaluation of good faith
should be made at the time of the settlement without the benefit of
hindsight.51 The Tech-Bilt court applied a reasonable person stan-
legedly improper use of a heart-lung machine. Plaintiff dismissed the machine's dis-
tributor from the case in return for a waiver of costs. The agreement was found in
good faith under the tortious conduct standard. Though the court felt bound to this
definition of good faith, it stated that the result was unfair because "[tihe rule permits
a plaintiff to insulate a defendant... from being liable to a codefendant ... for com-
parative indemnity .... " Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 498, 698 P.2d at 165, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
262 (quoting Cardio Systems, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 890-91, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 266).
45. This term came from the court's comment that "[tihe party asserting the lack
of good faith.., should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is
so far 'out of the ballpark' ... as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the
statute." Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499-500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.
46. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263. The court based its conclusion
on the policies of American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578,
578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) (doctrine of equitable indemnity established ex-
panding the principles of comparative liability between defendants).
47. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (quoting
Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 44 (1981)
(determining that bad faith was not established by such a showing)).
48. Id. The court also noted that where there are multiple plaintiffs, an important
factor is "the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs." Id.
49. Id. This factor is examined in detail in Roberts, The Financial Condition and
Insurance Policy Limits of a Joint Tortfeasor Wishing to Settle in Good Faith
Problems of Discovery and Confidentiality, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63 (1986).
50. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
51. Id at 499, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (evaluation of good faith should
dard: "A defendant's settlement figure must not be grossly dispropor-
tionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement,
would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be."52 The court
concluded that "[t]he party asserting the lack of good faith, who has
the burden of proof on that issue,53 should be permitted to demon-
strate ... that the settlement is so far 'out of the ballpark' in relation
to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of
the statute." 54
Under the facts in Tech-Bilt, the court held that the defendant's
waiver of any defense costs in exchange for a promise not to sue by
the plaintiff was not enough to qualify the agreement as a good faith
settlement. Consequently, the agreement failed to bar actions against
the settling defendant for contribution. However, Tech-Bilt did not
provide the court with an opportunity to apply the newly articulated
standard to a sliding scale agreement. Thus, the Tech-Bilt decision
left unresolved the questions of "(1) whether the good faith reason-
able range standard applies to sliding scale agreements; and (2) if so,
the manner in which this standard is to be applied." 55
IV. ABBOTT FORD V. SUPERIOR COURT: THE RESCUE OF
THE NONSETTLING DEFENDANT
Abbott Ford v. Superior Court56 was the first California Supreme
Court case following the Tech-Bilt decision to contest a sliding scale
settlement agreement. Thus, the court had to determine whether the
Tech-Bilt analysis of good faith was to be extended to Mary Carter
agreements.
A. Facts in Abbott Ford
An accident occurred when defendant Ramsey Sneed was driving a
used 1979 Ford van purchased from defendant Abbott Ford. While
Sneed was driving, the van's left rear tire flew off and crashed into
plaintiff Phyllis Smith's windshield. The plaintiff suffered serious in-
juries including lost vision in both eyes and lost sense of smell5 7
Smith, along with her husband, proceeded with an action against
be made to determine the effect of a settlement agreement before main trial is held
and damages ultimately decided).
52. Id. (citing Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825
(1984)).
53. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(d) (West Supp. 1989).
54. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499-500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.
55. See Comment, Sliding Scale Settlements: The Need for a Minimum Contribu-
tion to Comply with the Reasonable Range Test for Good Faith, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
995, 1006-07 (1986).
56. 43 Cal. 3d 858, 741 P.2d 124, 239 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1987).
57. Id, at 864, 741 P.2d at 127, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
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four defendants:5 8 Sneed, the driver of the van;5 9 Abbott Ford (Ab-
bott), who sold Sneed the used van;60 Ford Motor Co; (Ford), which
manufactured both vehicles; 61 and Sears who serviced the van prior
to the accident. 62
Following failed settlement negotiations with the parties,6 3 a slid-
ing scale agreement was entered into between the plaintiffs and Ab-
bott's insurer.64 The agreement guaranteed the plaintiffs a $3 million
recovery.65 Thus, if the plaintiffs did not collect the guaranteed
amount from the other defendants, Abbott's insurer would pay the
balance up to the guaranteed amount.66 In return, the plaintiffs
agreed to dismiss all of their actions against Abbott and to continue
the action against Ford and Sears.67 Additionally, Abbott's insurer
agreed to pay $3 million to the plaintiffs if the guarantee was found
invalid or not in good faith.68
Abbott then moved for a court hearing on the good faith of the
agreement.6 9 Ford and Sears argued that the settlement agreement
was not made in good faith.70 The trial court found that the agree-
ment was not a good faith settlement for two reasons. First, there
58. Id
59. Plaintiffs' case against Sneed was based on negligence in driving while hearing
sounds indicating a possible malfunction with the tires. Id, Plaintiff settled with
Sneed for $25,000. Id at 867 n.6, 741 P.2d at 129 n.6, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 631 n.6.
60. Plaintiffs' case against Abbott was based on negligence and strict liability for
Abbott's installation of inappropriate wheels and the later sale of the van to Sneed
without adequate warnings. Id at 864, 741 P.2d at 127, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
61. Plaintiffs' case against Ford was based on negligence, strict liability, and
breach of warranty for alleged defects in the rear wheel portion of the van and for
failure to adequately warn against using certain tires. Ford also was allegedly liable
for a defective windshield. Id at 865, 741 P.2d at 127, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
62. Plaintiffs' case against Sears was based on negligence in failing to properly in-
spect the brakes when the van was serviced three months prior to the accident. Id
63. Ford and Sears were unwilling to bear 30% of a proposed $2.5 million settle-
ment. Ford and Sears also declined to enter into a sliding scale agreement which
would guarantee the plaintiffs $1.5 million. Id at 866, 741 P.2d at 128, 239 Cal. Rptr. at
630.
64. Id
65. Id Abbott had expressed the opinion that the settlement value of the case was
approximately $2.5 million. Id
66. Id. It is common for a settling defendant to make a guarantee up to the limits
of a liability insurance policy. See Roberts, supra note 49, at 63 for a general discus-
sion of such use.
67. Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 858, 867, 741 P.2d 124, 128-29,
239 Cal. Rptr. 626, 631 (1987).
68. Id at 867, 741 P.2d at 129, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
69. Id See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1989) procedures for having
a good faith hearing; see also supra note 38.
70. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 867, 741 P.2d at 129, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
was no minimum payment; second, it "[did] not constitute a settle-
ment, but rather constitute[d] a gambling transaction."71 Abbott ap-
pealed; the appellate court reversed the trial court and held that the
agreement was not tortious, and therefore was a good faith settle-
ment.72 The California Supreme Court remanded the case back to
the appellate court to determine "good faith" in compliance with the
newly announced Tech-Bilt standard.73 The court of appeals again
found that, as a matter of law, the agreement was made in good
faith.74 The California Supreme Court granted review to reconsider
the issues presented.75
B. Holdings in Abbott Ford
1. Applicability of Tech-Bilt Standards to Sliding Scale
Agreements
The California Supreme Court concluded that sliding scale agree-
ments are subject to the good faith standard as set out in Tech-Bilt,
thus concurring with the appellate court's rationale.7 6 The appellate
court had reasoned that "[tihe same considerations apply to :sliding
scale agreements as to [regular] settlements . . .and the Tech-Bilt
analysis is equally feasible when so applied." 77
The supreme court rejected the nonsettling defendants' contention
that all sliding scale agreements per se lack good faith.78 Sears and
Ford argued that sliding scale agreements lack good faith by conflict-
ing with the goals of equitable apportionment and encouragement of
settlement. 79 To support their claim, Ford and Sears noted that
under the sliding scale agreement at issue, "if a jury were to assess
plaintiff's damages from the accident at $3 million or more ... Ford
or Sears would ostensibly be required to bear all of the damages, and
Abbott-the party who, by all appearances, is the most culpable
tortfeasor-would escape any ultimate out-of-pocket loss
whatsoever."o8
The supreme court examined sliding scale agreements in other
cases. In Dompeling, the settlement agreement included a noncon-
71. Id. at 868, 741 P.2d at 129, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
72. Id The court applied the Dompeling test. See supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text.
73. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 868, 741 P.2d at 130, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 632. See supra
notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
74. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 868, 741 P.2d at 130, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 875, 741 P.2d at 134-35, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
77. Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. Rptr. 250, 255 (1985) (omitted
from official reporter).
78. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 875, 741 P.2d at 135, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
79. Id.
80. Id, at 876, 741 P.2d at 135, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (citations omitted).
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tingent $100,000 outright payment and a sliding scale agreement for
$10,000.. Since the $100,000 noncontingent payment could be offset
against the plaintiff's recovery, the court concluded that the fair ap-
portionnent doctrine was not violated.8 1 In Rogers & Wells v. Supe-
rior Court, the settlement agreement did not have a noncontingent
payment.8 2 However, the Rogers court found that since the defend-
ant was only minimally at fault, the agreement was not at odds with
the fair apportionment objective.8 3 Thus, the court concluded that
sliding scale agreements per se do not necessarily conflict with the
objective of fair apportionment.8 4
The court also rejected the argument of Ford and Sears that such
agreements deter the remaining defendants from ever settling.8 5 The
court agreed that in some cases this may occur, but maintained that
in other situations an agreement may encourage additional
settlement.8 6
Neither policies of equitable apportionment nor encouragement of
settlements are per se violated by a sliding scale agreement. Conse-
quently, each agreement must be considered individually to deter-
mine whether it meets the Tech-Bilt good faith standard. The sliding
scale agreement will meet the Tech-Bilt good faith standard if the
amount of consideration paid by the settling defendant falls within
the Tech-Bilt ballpark.87
81. Id. at 876, 741 P.2d at 136, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (citing Dompeling v. Superior
Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 802, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981)).
82. Id. at 875, 741 P.2d at 136, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (citing Rogers & Wells v. Supe-
rior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 545, 220 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1985)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 877, 741 P.2d at 136, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (citing Rogers & Wells v. Supe-
rior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 545, 220 Cal. Rptr 767 (1985)).
85. Id. at 880, 741 P.2d at 138, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 640. See Comment, Sliding Scale
Settlements: The Need for a Minimum Contribution to Comply with the Reasonable
Range Test for Good Faith, 19 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 995, 1021 (1986). Initially, the agree-
ment will deter settlements as the plaintiff has already received a cash outlay and is
thus in a well funded and "litigatious frame of mind." Id. With a guaranteed mini-
mum recovery, the plaintiff is relatively secure in holding out for a larger settlement.
Id. Thus, "sliding scale agreements may work not to promote settlement but rather to
ensure that litigation will continue." Id.
86. Abbott Ford Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 858, 880, 741 P.2d 124, 138-39, 239
Cal. Rptr. 626, 640-41 (1987).
87. Id. at 877, 741 P.2d at 136, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 638. The court said that equitable
apportionment will be satisfied if the agreement is fair to the nonsettling defendant.
Id. The court further noted that, under section 877 of the California Civil Procedure
Code, a good faith settlement will reduce the claims of the plaintiff by the amount of
the consideration. Id. Thus, "[i]f a court finds that a settling defendant, by entering
into a sliding scale agreement, has realistically paid a 'consideration' that is within its
Tech-Bilt 'ballpark,' and if the nonsettling defendants obtain a reduction in the plain-
2. Determination of Consideration and the Ballpark
Since the amount of consideration must fall within the Tech-Bilt
ballpark, both the amount of consideration and the reasonable range
or "ballpark" need to be determined. The amount of consideration is
important for two reasons. First, it is an essential factor in determin-
ing if the agreement was made in good faith.88 Second, the judgment
against the nonsettling defendants is statutorily reduced by the
amount of consideration.8 9 The court recognized the difficulty in de-
termining an accurate price for the consideration paid by a settling
defendant who enters into a sliding scale agreement. 90
In Tech-Bilt, the parties disagreed as to the value of the considera-
tion. Ford and Sears argued that the minimum amount of the pay-
ment, zero, should be used.91 Abbott argued that the maximum
amount, or $3 million, should be used.92 The court adopted a compro-
mise position, reasoning that the guarantee "is not completely cost-
free... [nor is it] equal to the maximum amount that the guarantor
may possibly be required to pay under the agreement."93
Declining to determine the actual value, the court stated that the
parties to the agreement are in a superior position for determining
value, and therefore the burden of valuation is properly placed upon
the parties, not upon the court.94 This valuation should be negotiated
as part of the sliding scale agreement by joint valuation.95 The justi-
fication for joint valuation is that the plaintiff will advocate a low
value to minimize the reduction of claims against the other defend-
ants,96 whereas the settling defendant will seek a higher value so
that the agreement will be found within the Tech-Bilt ballpark-thus
relieving liability for contribution or equitable indemnity.97 There-
fore, requiring a joint valuation should result in a reasonable
tiff's claims against them in an amount equal to that consideration, the statutory fair
apportionment objective should be satisfied." I& (citations omitted).
88. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
89. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1989).
90. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 878, 741 P.2d at 137, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
91. Id This was the view before Abbott Ford. See infra note 113 and accompany-
ing text.
92. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 878, 741 P.2d at 137, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
93. Id at 878-79, 741 P.2d at 137, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
94. Id at 879, 741 P.2d at 137, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40.
95. Id at 879, 741 P.2d at 137, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
96. Id.
97. Id It may not necessarily be that the settling defendant wants a high value on
the consideration. The settling defendant must reduce this amount from the judgment
before its guarantee applies. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. Also, the
settling defendant's clause may be void if an' agreement fails; if this occurs, he is no
worse off than without the agreement. The settling defendant will be primarily con-
cerned with the terms because without favorable terms, the settling defendant proba-
bly will not care if the agreement satisfies the good faith standard.
[Vol. 16: 795, 1989] Mary Carter Agreements
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
valuation. 98
Once the settling parties have determined a value, the nonsettling
party can accept the value and argue that the settlement is in bad
faith because the declared value is outside of the settling defendant's
Tech-Bilt ballpark.99 Alternatively, the nonsettling party can argue
that the valuation is too low and that a larger reduction of plaintiff's
claims against the nonsettling defendants is warranted.100 When the
trial court must determine whether the valuation is accurate, an esti-
mate is sufficient if it considers the size of the guarantee along with
the likelihood that the settling party will actually have to pay out
either that amount or some lesser sum.101
In arriving at the ballpark or reasonable range, the court will use
the same set of criteria that was enumerated in Tech-Bilt.102 In addi-
tion, the Abbott Ford court recognized that sometimes a sliding scale
agreement is entered into solely because some of the defendants re-
fuse to cooperate in settlement negotiations.1 03 Should this occur,
the court is authorized to adjust the ballpark figure to:take into ac-
count the nonsettling defendant's acts which have impeded settle-
ment negotiations. 104 Thus, the court upon finding such conduct
"may reduce the lower threshold of the 'ballpark' cut-off, and find a
settlement in good faith even if the 'consideration' . . . is somewhat
lower than the court would otherwise have found acceptable."105
98. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 879, 741 P.2d at 137, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 640. In many
cases, traditional settlements may have been negotiated as an alternative to the sliding
scale agreement. Id. These negotiations will be useful in ascertaining the value of con-
sideration for the sliding scale settlement agreement. Id.
99. 1i at 879, 741 P.2d at 138, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
100. Id. But see Justice Broussard's concurring opinion which suggests that permit-
ting such an alternative will create a "mini-trial with actuaries and economists testify-
ing at length." Id. at 887, 741 P.2d at 143, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 646' (Broussard, J.,
concurring).
101. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 879 n.23, 741 P.2d at 138 n.23, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 640
n.23 (citations omitted).
102. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
103. The court reasoned that "the recalcitrant defendant's unyielding position may
... make it impossible for any of the defendants to settle the litigation.., because the
plaintiff may be unwilling to release any of the... [joint] defendants without an assur-
ance that he will at least recover a minimum sum... necessary to compensate him for
his injuries." Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 881, 741 P.2d at 139, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
104. Id at 882, 741 P.2d at 139-40, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 642. The court expressed some
concern for defendants who in good faith believe they bear no liability for a plaintiff's
injury. Id, at 881, 741 P.2d at 139, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 641. Thus, the court was unwilling
to universally deny a defendant the right to attack good faith where recalcitrance was
evident. Id
105. Id. at 882, 741 P.2d at 139, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
After the consideration and the "ballpark" are determined, the
court will decide whether the consideration falls within the ballpark
of the settling defendant's fair share of liability. If so, the agreement
is in good faith and there are two important consequences. First,
there can be no contribution action against the settling defendant.106
Second, the amount of consideration must be reduced from the plain-
tiff's judgment.10 7
The court answered, in a footnote, the question as to how this re-
duction would apply to the guarantee made by the settling defend-
ant. 08 According to the court, "the obligation of the settling
defendant to the plaintiff ... will now be the difference, if any, be-
tween the amount of total damages awarded against a nonsettling de-
fendant, reduced by the valuation of the sliding scale agreement, and
the guaranteed amount." 0 9 Thus, the judgment will be reduced
before the settling defendant's amount of payment is determined.110
Consequently, the settling defendant will be called upon more often
to make good under the guarantee in the sliding scale settlement
agreement."'
C. Effect of Abbott Ford on Sliding Scale Agreements
The Abbott Ford decision substantially affects sliding scale agree-
ments. One of the most dramatic results of the decision is that plain-
tiffs must subtract a consideration from the judgment against the
nonsettling defendants." 2 In prior decisions, only noncontingent
payments were reduced from the judgment.1 3 Thus, a plaintiff could
not lose by entering into a sliding scale agreement: the plaintiff
would always receive the judgment and, where the guarantee was
106. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877(b) (West Supp. 1989).
107. Id. § 877(a). See supra note 33 for full text of statute.
108. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 885 n.27, 741 P.2d at 142 n.27, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 644
n.27.
109. Id. The court could have just as easily placed the cost directly on the plaintiff
by not reducing the judgment amount to which the guarantee applies. Perhaps, the
court desired to uphold the policy of providing a maximum recovery for injured plain-
tiffs. See supra note 28.
110. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 885 n.27, 741 P.2d at 142 n.27, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 644
n.27. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text (hypothetical in following
discussion).
111. See Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 885 n.27, 741 P.2d at 142 n.27, 239 Cal. Rptr. at
644 n.27 ("The result of the offset requirement . . . [will] increas[e] the odds that the
settling defendant will be obligated to perform under its guaranty agreement with
plaintiff.").
112. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
113. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 877 n.21, 741 P.2d at 136 n.21, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39
n.21. The court reasoned that if nothing is paid to the plaintiff, there is no considera-
tion. Id, (citing Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 473, 113 Cal. Rptr.
416, 431 (1974)).
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larger, he could receive that amount instead.114 This was at the ex-
pense of the nonsettling defendant who was always liable for the en-
tire judgment and was prohibited from obtaining contribution from
the settling defendants. Abbott Ford causes the plaintiff to lose this
"free lunch" and thus requires payment for this advantage. 1' 5 Conse-
quently, the agreement has become less attractive to the plaintiff.116
The settling defendant also loses a great deal because of Abbott
Ford. In fact, the settling defendant will usually be the most nega-
tively affected party because the Abbott Ford ruling requires a reduc-
tion of consideration from the judgment. 1' 7 As discussed earlier, the
settling defendant must pay the difference between the judgment
which is now reduced by the consideration, and the guaranteed
amount which is not reduced.11 8 The consequence is that the agree-
ment is substantially more unattractive to settling defendants.
The effects of Abbott Ford can best be illustrated through hy-
potheticals. In the first hypothetical, the plaintiff has a sliding scale
settlement agreement with the settling defendant for a guaranteed
recovery amount of $800,000. The agreement, which meets the good
faith requirements in Tech-Bilt, has a consideration value of $400,000.
The judgment is $600,000. Prior to Abbott Ford, the plaintiff would
receive $800,000; the nonsettling defendant would pay $600,000; the
settling defendant would pay $200,000.119 After Abbott Ford, the
114. Thus, prior to Abbott Ford, the plaintiff had a "free lunch." There was no con-
sideration to be paid and the plaintiff could only stand to benefit by having a sliding
scale agreement. After Abbott Ford, however, the plaintiff pays a price whenever the
judgment is greater than the guarantee. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text
(hypothetical).
115. Although the settling party usually pays for most of the offset that the nonset-
tling defendant gets, the plaintiff may pay indirectly with less favorable terms, e.g.,
lower guaranteed payments. However, the plaintiff does have direct costs when the
judgment exceeds the guarantee. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
116. According to the Abbott Ford court, "[t]he rapid increase in the attractiveness
of such agreements to plaintiffs in recent years may have been based, in large part, on
the fact that prior decisions have permitted plaintiffs to receive [the benefit] . . . with-
out any corresponding reduction .... Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 885 n.27, 741 P.2d at
142 n.27, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 644 n.27.
117. The settling defendant pays whenever the judgment is less than the total of
the guarantee plus the consideration. See inkfra notes 120-26 and accompanying text
for hypotheticals. Note that the settling defendant pays nothing if the judgment is
$200,000 or more.
118. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
119. Prior to Abbott Ford, the guarantee applied to the entire judgment, which is
not reduced further by the value of the consideration. Thus, the settling defendant
must pay only $200,000 ($800,000 - $600,000). The nonsettling defendant does not ob-
tain an offset for the value of the consideration from the judgment in which he is
jointly liable; thus, the defendant must pay $600,000 to the plaintiff. Furthermore,
plaintiff would still recover $800,000, but the nonsettling defendant's
payment would be only $200,000, and the settling defendant would
now pay $600,000 to make up the balance of the guarantee. 12o
In this first hypothetical, where the plaintiff's judgment is less
than the guaranteed amount, the plaintiff's outcome is not changed
by Abbott Ford.121 The settling defendant, however, pays substan-
tially more after Abbott Ford.122 The next hypothetical chse will il-
lustrate differences if the judgment exceeds the guarantee amount.
This second hypothetical will use the same sliding scale agreement
as above. However, this time the judgment will be changed to
$1,000,000. Prior to Abbott Ford, the result would be $1,000,000 to
plaintiff; the nonsettling defendant would pay $1,000,000; the settling
defendant would pay nothing.123 After Abbott Ford, the plaintiff re-
covers only $800,000, the guarantee amount as opposed to the judg-
ment.124 The nonsettling defendant's payment is reduced to $600,000
and the settling defendant must pay $200,000.125
This hypothetical shows that both the plaintiff and the settling de-
fendant can be adversely affected by the decision in Abbott Ford,
which permits nonsettling defendants to offset an amount of consid-
eration when a sliding scale agreement is used. Plaintiff will always
have a less favorable outcome after Abbott Ford whenever the judg-
ment exceeds the guarantee.126 However, the plaintiff's position
since the agreement is in good faith, the nonsettling defendant is barred from seeking
a contribution action against the settling defendant. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(b)
(West Supp. 1989).
120. The value of the consideration ($400,000) is subtracted from the judgment
($600,000) so that the nonsettling defendant owes $200,000. The settling defendant
guarantees a recovery of $800,000 and $200,000 has already been paid by the nonset-
ting defendant. Thus, the settling defendant must pay the difference ($600,000).
121. But see supra note 115. Note that the plaintiff's position does change after Ab-
bott Ford where the judgment exceeds the guarantee. See infra notes 124-25 and ac-
companying text.
122. Here, the settling defendant must pay $400,000 more. The settling defendant
will always pay more after Abbott Ford unless the guarantee amount or maximum lia-
bility has been reached.
123. Prior to Abbott Ford, the judgment was not reduced by the value of the agree-
ment. Therefore, the nonsettling defendant would pay the full judgment amount
($1,000,000). Furthermore, as the guarantee was less than the judgment, the settling
defendant would pay nothing.
124. When subtraction of the consideration value from the judgment equals less
than the guaranteed amount, the plaintiff will receive only. the amount of the
guarantee.
125. The value of the consideration ($400,000) is subtracted from the judgment
($1,000,000) so that the nonsettling defendant owes $600,000. The settling defendant
guarantees a recovery of $800,000 and $600,000 has already been paid by the nonset-
tling defendant. Thus, the settling defendant must pay the difference ($200,000).
126. This is illustrated in the first hypothetical. See supra text accompanying notes
119-22.
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does not change if the judgment is less than the guarantee amount.127
The settling defendant will always be in a worse position after Abbott
Ford except where the judgment is greater than the combined total
of the guarantee plus the consideration.128
In another blow to the settling defendant, the court placed a limit
on the right of the settling defendant to veto a subsequent settle-
ment.129 In Abbott Ford, the agreement contained a common provi-
sion stating that "[plaintiffs] shall not settle all or any portion of this
litigation with defendants Ford and Sears Roebuck for less than the
amount of [their] guarant[eed recovery], without the express written
consent of [Abbott's insurer]."130 This open-ended veto clause was
deemed excessive. The court now permits only a veto of a subse-
quent settlement which is unfairly low and results in the settling de-
fendant bearing more than its proportionate share of the plaintiff's
damages.131 This limitation of power for the settling defendant
makes the agreement less attractive to the settling defendant.13 2 On
the other hand, it allows the remaining defendants to have a fair op-
portunity to settle.
The decision also burdens the negotiation process since the parties
must determine a value of consideration on the sliding sale agree-
ment.133 This forces parties to negotiate a term that would not other-
wise need to be negotiated in a regular settlement setting. This
additional burden on the parties may be enough to discourage the
127. This is illustrated in the second hypothetical. See supra text accompanying
notes 119-22 and 123-25. But see supra note 115.
128. This is evident in both hypotheticals. See supra text accompanying notes 119-
25. If the judgment exceeds the guarantee and the consideration, i.e., $1,200,000 in the
hypothetical ($800,000 + $400,000), the nonsettling defendant would pay the judgment
amount minus the consideration value ($1,200,000 - $400,000; or $800,000); the settling
defendant would pay nothing because his liability would remain constant at $800,000
since the agreement limits the liability to the guarantee amount.
129. Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 858, 883, 741 P.2d 124, 140, 239
Cal. Rptr. 626, 642-43 (1987).
130. Id at 882-83, 741 P.2d at 140, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (emphasis in original).
131. Id at 883, 741 P.2d at 140, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43.
132. The settling defendant must be willing to settle under a standard settlement
agreement since a later settlement may have the effect of changing the guaranteed
amount (or value of guarantee) into a noncontingent payment. The settling defendant
should anticipate this contingency and state another amount acceptable, if a later set-
tlement is reached with the remaining defendants. Alternatively, the settling defend-
ant may decide that the sliding scale settlement agreement should be void if a later
settlement occurs. The courts may, however, refuse to uphold such a clause since it
gives settling defendants some degree of control.
133. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
sliding scale settlement and encourage regular settlements which are
simpler to negotiate.
The effect is that, when sliding scale agreements are litigated, min-
itrials may become common. Thus, using the Mary Carter agreement
may actually create rather than obviate litigation.134 In Tech-Bilt,
Chief Justice Bird's dissenting opinion expressed concern that the
adoption of the Tech-Bilt ballpark test will result in an "unworkable
standard to every settlement."13 5 She felt it would "clog our trial
courts with unnecessary hearings, discourage the settlement of legiti-
mate claims, and severely strain the resources of the parties .... "136
Justice Broussard, in a concurring opinion in Abbott Ford, feared that
the ballpark test could even cause a second minitrial in many
cases.'3 7 He predicted that "sliding scale agreements will contain a
provision that the agreement is void, not only if the court finds that
the settlement figure furnished by the parties is less than the
'ballpark' figure, but also if the court finds that the agreement is
worth more than that figure."s38 Therefore, he concluded that "[iun
either event ... [we] may then have a second minitrial."39
The result is that after Abbott Ford, Mary Carter agreements are
less attractive. Most significantly, plaintiffs and nonsettling defend-
ants, in many cases, will be monetarily worse off by using the agree-
ment. Further, Abbott Ford has created limitations on the right to
veto, has increased burdens in negotiating the value of consideration,
and quite possibly, has introduced additional litigation in the form of
a minitrial. Although the courts may not like the strain on judicial
calendars from adding another layer of adjudication, nonsettling de-
fendants will benefit by receiving fairer treatment.
V. PROPOSITION 51 AND ITS EFFECT ON MARY CARTER
AGREEMENTS
A. Proposition 51-Background
In 1986, California voters approved Proposition 51 which modified
134. The objective of encouraging settlements entails an element of judicial econ-
omy. If this objective is thwarted, agreements may become invalid.
135. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 502, 698 P.2d 159,
168, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 265 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
137. Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 858, 888, 741 P.2d 124, 144, 239
Cal. Rptr. 626, 646 (1987) (Broussard, J., concurring).
138. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting). Broussard noted that "[w]hile a trial judge
could attempt to undertake the complex calculation of the estimate of the value of the
sliding scale agreement on the basis of affidavits.... most judges will want the experts
before them, [resulting in] an extended mini-trial." Id. at 888, 741 P.2d at 144, 239 Cal.
Rptr. at 646 (Broussard, J., concurring).
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the law of joint and several liability in California. 140 Proposition 51
was a response to the inequitable treatment of deep pocket defend-
ants who often had to bear a substantial financial burden even when
they were only slightly at fault.14 Proposition 51, also known as the
Fair Responsibility Act, limits noneconomic damages for each de-
fendant to their respective degree of fault.14 2 Consequently, Proposi-
tion 51 may play a significant role in limiting the use of Mary Carter
agreements.
Under the rule of joint liability,1 43 joint or multiple tortfeasors are
each individually liable for the entire judgment. 4 4 Prior to Proposi-
tion 51, all damages were subject to joint liability.145 However, under
140. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West Supp. 1989).
141. Section 1431.1, which is part of Proposition 51, states as follows:
(a) The legal doctrine of joint and several liability, also known as "the deep
pocket rule," has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice that has
threatened financial bankruptcy of local governments, other public agencies,
private individuals and businesses and has resulted in higher prices for goods
and services to the public and in higher taxes to the taxpayers.
(b) Some governmental and private defendants are perceived to have sub-
stantial financial resources or insurance coverage and have thus been included
in lawsuits even though there was little or no basis for finding them at fault.
Under joint and several liability, if they are found to share even a fraction of
the fault, they often are held financially liable for all the damage. The Peo-
ple-taxpayers and consumers alike-ultimately pay for these lawsuits in the
form of higher taxes, higher prices and higher insurance premiums.
(c) Local governments have been forced to curtail some essential police, fire
and other protections because of the soaring costs of lawsuits and insurance
premiums.
Therefore, the People of the State of California declare that to remedy
these inequities, defendants in tort actions shall be held financially liable in
closer proportion to their degree of fault. To treat them differently is unfair
and inequitable.
The People of the State of California further declare that reforms in the lia-
bility laws in tort actions are necessary and proper to avoid catastrophic eco-
nomic consequences for state and local governmental bodies as well as private
individuals and businesses.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1 (West Supp. 1989).
142. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1989).
143. Several cases made inroads on the common law joint and several liabiity doc-
trine: American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) (comparative equitable indemnity claim via cross-complaint or
separate indemnity action); Li v. Yellow Cab, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975) (comparative negligence); Paradise Valley Hosp. v. Schlossman, 143
Cal. App. 3d 87, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1983) (developed rule that where defendant is in-
solvent, shortfall is apportioned equitably among remaining parties).
144. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Transport Corp., 277 F. Supp. 457, 461 (E.D.
Va. 1967) (joint tortfeasors equal persons jointly or severally liable in tort for same in-
jury to person or property); Winzler & Kelly v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 3d 385,
391-92, 122 Cal. Rptr. 259, 263 (1975).
145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431 (West 1982) (statute prior to 1986 amendment).
Proposition 51, noneconomic damages are not subject to joint liabil-
ity.146 Consequently, only economic damages still remain subject to
joint liability.147
In Evangelatos v. Superior Court,148 the California Supreme Court
held that Proposition 51 applied prospectively rather than retroac-
tively.149 Proposition 51 became operative on June 4, 1986, and ap-
plies to causes of action originating on or after this date.150 It applies
to "any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful
death, based upon principles of comparative fault ... ."151 Principles
of comparative fault apply to cases involving negligence, strict liabil-
ity, and willful misconduct. 152 Although Proposition 51 applies
where the plaintiff is partially at fault, there is disagreement among
146. Section 1431.2, a key part of Proposition 51, states:
(a) In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death,
based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for
non-economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each de-
fendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allo-
cated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of
fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for
that amount.
(b)(1) For purposes of this section, the term "economic damages" means ob-
jectively verifiable monetary losses including medical expenses, loss of earn-
ings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement, costs
of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment and loss of busi-
ness or employment opportunities.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the term "non-economic damages"
means subjective, non-monetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suf-
fering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and
companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1989).
147. Section 1431 was amended after Proposition 51 and reads as follows:
An obligation imposed upon several persons, or a right created in favor of
several persons, is presumed to be joint, and not several, except as provided in
Section 1431.2, and except in the special cases mentioned in the title on the
interpretation of contracts. This presumption, in the case of a right, can be
overcome only by express words to the contrary.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431 (West Supp. 1989).
148. 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 753 P.2d 585, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1988).
149. Id Before this case was decided, conflicting decisions by the California appel-
late courts were made. In Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 810, 812, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 102, 103 (1986), the court determined that Proposition 51 applied prospectively.
The appellate court in Evangelatos held that Proposition 51 applied retroactively.
Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 320, 328, 234 Cal. Rptr. 344, 349 (1987),
rev'd, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 753 P.2d 585, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1988). Evangelatos was appealed
to the supreme court and reversed. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188,
1193, 753 P.2d 585, 587, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 631 (1988).
150. The initiative was passed on June 3, 1986. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5
(West Supp. 1989) (legislative history). As a statute which is adopted by an initiative,
Proposition 51 took effect and became operative the day after the election. See CAL.
CONsT. art. II, § 10(a).
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1989).
152. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978) (comparative fault in strict liability action); see also Sor-
ensen v. Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 726, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441, 446 (1980) (comparative
fault in willful misconduct case). However, comparative fault does not apply to inten-
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commentators as to whether it applies when the plaintiff is not at
fault.153
Some commentators have interpreted the clause "[i]n any action
... based upon principles of comparative fault"154 to mean that the
plaintiff must exhibit some negligence for comparative fault to ex-
ist.15s However, it has also been suggested that the phrase is meant
to apply more broadly to encompass any situation comparing the con-
duct of any parties. 156 Both the California Ballot Pamphlet157 and
the Joint Hearing of the Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committee
on Proposition 51 158 provide illustrations which apply Proposition 51
to situations where the plaintiff is not at fault. The policy behind
Proposition 51-to provide equitable treatment for deep pocket de-
fendants-is equally applicable regardless of whether a plaintiff is at
fault.159 Although the latter view appears more reasonable, the issue
will remain unresolved until decided by the courts.
The procedural steps to implement Proposition 51 are as follows.1 6 0
First, a dollar amount for noneconomic damages must be determined
separate from the amount awarded for economic and other dam-
ages.161 Second, a separate fault percentage must be assigned to each
liable defendant.162 Third, each liable defendant must receive a sepa-
rate judgment.16 3
The following example illustrates how damages are calculated af-
ter Proposition 51. P, the plaintiff, initiates a personal injury action
tional acts. See Allen v. Sundean, 137 Cal. App. 3d 216, 225-27, 186 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868-
70 (1982).
153. See Special Proposition 51 Issue: Does Proposition 51 Apply If Plaintiff Is Not
at Fault?, 76 CAL. TORT REP. 153, 163 (July 1986) [hereinafter Special Issue].
154. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1989).
155. Special Issue, supra note 153, at 163.
156. Id.
157. California Ballot Pamphlet; Argument in Favor of Proposition 51 (reprinted
in Joint Hearing of the Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committee on Proposition 51,
at 96 (Apr. 18, 1986)).
158. Joint Hearing of the Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committee on Proposi-
tion 51 at 99 (Apr. 18, 1986).
159. The major reason for adopting Proposition 51 was to lower insurance prices
and thereby keep consumer costs down. Id. To meet this objective, Proposition 51
should be applied regardless of whether plaintiff is at fault.
160. For instance, many jury instructions have been changed. See Peyrat, Proposi-
tion 51: A First Analysis 29-32 (CCEB Spec. Supp. Aug. 1986) (Appendix B lists 26 jury
instructions which were considered for modification by the BAJI committee.). See id.
at 11 for a discussion of the role of the jury and the trial judge after Proposition 51.
161. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1989).
162. Id.
163. Id.
against A and B, defendants, for $100,000 in economic losses and
$200,000 in noneconomic losses. The defendants, A and B, are deter-
mined to be 50% and 30% at fault respectively, while P is determined
to be 20% at fault.164 A and B are jointly and severally liable for
$80,000 ((50% + 30%) X $100,000) for P's economic losses. In addi-
tion, A would be individually liable for $100,000 (50% X $200,000) of
P's noneconomic losses, and B would be liable for $60,000 (30% X
$200,000).
B. Applicability to Settlement Agreements
1. Effect on Traditional Settlements
While there is almost no discussion of Proposition 51's application
to sliding scale agreements, commentators have discussed Proposition
51's application to traditional settlement agreements. 65 Under a
traditional settlement agreement, the settling defendant would pro-
vide a noncontingent payment to the plaintiff which would represent
either economic or noneconomic damages, or both. There are three
possible ways a court may allocate this settlement amount. First, the
court can initially apply the settlement amount to the defendant's
share of noneconomic damages and then apply the remainder to the
economic damages.166 Second, the court may apply the settlement
amount first to the economic damages and then apply the remaining
amount to the noneconomic damages.16 7 Finally, the court may allo-
cate the settlement amount in proportion to the overall percentage of
economic and noneconomic damages.' 68 Of these views, the third
method has received the most support among commentators. 69
164. In a Proposition 51 case with all tortfeasors present, the jury determines dam-
ages by computing the comparable fault of each party and the amount of the plaintiff's
economic and noneconomic damages. Presumably, this will be done by special verdict.
See BAJI, California Jury Instructions: Civil, BAJI No. 16.00 (7th ed. 1986) (Form of
Special Verdict-Negligence).
165. See Joint and Several Liability: The Tough Issues 23-24 (CCEB July/Aug.
1986); Special Issue, supra note 153, at 167-70; Klein & Day, Prop. 51 and the House
that Tech-Bilt, 6 CAL. LAW. 25 (Nov. 1986).
166. Illustration 1. A and B are defendants who are both 50% liable for a recovery
of $200,000 of economic damages and $800,000 of noneconomic damages. A settles for
$500,000. The court would apply the first $400,000 toward A's share of the
noneconomic damages (50% x $800,000), and the remaining $100,000 would be applied
against the economic damages.
167. Illustration 2. Same facts as in Illustration 1. See supra note 166. Under this
approach, the settlement would first be allocated to economic damages, $200,000, and
the remaining $300,000 toward A's share of noneconomic damages. The plaintiff could
not collect the full $400,000 for noneconomic damages from A.
168. Illustration 3. Same facts as Illustration 1. See supra note 166. Under this ap-
proach, the proportion of economic damages to noneconomic damages is 25% ($200,000/
$800,000). Thus $125,000 (25% X $500,000) is allocated to economic damages and
$375,000 is allowed for noneconomic damages.
169. This view has been described as "fairest to the nonsettling defendant." Special
Issue, supra note 153, at 169. See also Bracket v. State, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1171, 226 Cal.
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2. Applicability to Sliding Scale Settlements
Many unanswered questions exist regarding the application of
Proposition 51 to sliding scale settlement agreements. Although the
effects of Proposition 51 on regular settlement agreements are rela-
tively straightforward,170 the application to Mary Carter agreements
is more complex.1
7 1
As discussed earlier, the liability for noneconomic damages is sev-
eral not joint.17 2 Consequently, nonsettling defendants are not liable
for the settling defendant's share of noneconomic damages.173 In ad-
dition, each defendant is subject to a separate judgment for their own
share of noneconomic damages.174 However, sliding scale agreements
must have one judgment with at least two defendants.175 Thus, a
sliding scale agreement would not be appropriate for noneconomic
damages because a separate judgment is imposed on each defend-
ant.176 Therefore, a sliding scale agreement should be used only for
economic damages.17 7
Rptr. 1 (1986) (indemnity action using similar apportionment). There is no noticeable
support for the second position. If the settlement amount were allocated first to the
economic damages for which all defendants remain jointly and severally liable, then
there would be no incentive for the plaintiff or defendant to settle. Special Issue,
supra note 153, at 169. Some commentators reject the second position by using the fol-
lowing rationale:
Assuming that the appellate courts ... will allow the non-settling defendant
to compare fault using the fault of the settling party as a basis of comparison
... it [is] likely that they will reject allowing the non-settling defendant also
to credit all dollars from the settlement towards joint liability. This "double
discount" to a non-settling defendant would be a disincentive to plaintiffs be-
ing willing to reach partial settlements. Similarly, any system in which a set-
tling defendant could be held liable to a non-settling defendant for sums by
which his settlement was deficient, as later determined at the trial, would be
an enormous disincentive for that defendant to settle.
Id
170. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
171. A sliding scale agreement is more complex than a standard settlement because
there are more variables, e.g., valuation to offset nonsettling defendant's liability.
172. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1989).
173. This liability is several and not joint, and thus, cannot be imposed on another.
See Special Issue, supra note 153, at 168.
174. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1989).
175. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
176. See Special Issue, supra note 153, at 168 ("[The settlement] should not affect
the share of non-economic damages for which the nonsettling defendant can be held
severably liable, since the settling defendant is not a 'joint judgment debtor' for that
amount.").
177. "[A] settlement by one defendant with the plaintiff should affect only that de-
fendant's joint liability for economic damages and his own several liability for non-eco-
nomic damages." Id (emphasis in original).
Ironically, noneconomic damages rather than economic damages
have a greater need for settlement agreements. As noneconomic
damages are more uncertain, they provide an inducement to enter
into some form of settlement agreement. 178 When noneconomic
damages constitute the majority of damages, a sliding scale agree-
ment for econdmic damages may be of little benefit. 179
Plaintiffs agree to sliding scale agreements in order to ensure a
minimum recovery. 80 Thus, the plaintiff may view such an agree-
ment as a form of insurance where the premium is in the form of a
reduced recovery. In an action where substantial noneconomic loss
exists, this insurance effect becomes severely diluted. A plaintiff, at
best, can insure only a minimum amount of economic damages.
Thus, plaintiffs will find that Proposition 51 has made the Mary
Carter agreement less attractive.
Defendants agree to sliding scale agreements in order to limit po-
tential liability, to remove themselves from the suit, and to possibly
avoid all liability.' 8 ' Attempts to limit liability by a sliding scale
agreement are not effective since noneconomic damages in personal
injury suits can be astronomical. 8 2 In addition, a settling defendant
must remain in the action to contest noneconomic damages.' 8 3 Fi-
nally, a defendant cannot normally escape without some liability. 8 4
Thus, the purposes for entering into sliding scale agreements are now
frustrated and the agreements are thus less attractive to settling de-
fendants in light of Proposition 51.185
An alternative to this frustration is to settle the noneconomic dam-
ages through a traditional settlement agreement and use a sliding
178. A ceiling on such damages reduces the risk of astronomical damages.
179. See i74fra notes 185-85 and accompanying text.
180. See Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980).
The Fisher court stated that the most important policy is that the injured party receive
a maximum recovery to the extent that others have caused these injuries. See supra
note 28.
181. See Comment, supra note 55, at 1020-21.
182. Noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering and emotional distress can
cause astronomical damages.
183. The settling defendant cannot escape liability for his share of plaintiff's
noneconomic damages.
184. In addition to noneconomic damages liability, the defendant will usually incur
liability under the agreement due to Abbott Ford.
185. In addition, a settling defendant may also be placed in inconsistent positions.
With a sliding scale agreement, the defendant desires a large recovery because his lia-
bility is reduced as the recovery approaches the guaranteed amount. However, if the
defendant fails to settle his liability for noneconomic damages, he wants noneconomic
damages to be low. Thus, to the extent that there is a correlation between large eco-
nomic damages and large nonecomonic damages, the defendant may lose regardless of
the outcome. The defendant wants the plaintiff to receive a large recovery in order to
incur little or no liability for the guaranteed payment. On the other hand, the defend-
ant wants the plaintiff to receive a small recovery so that he has little or no liability
for noneconomic damages.
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scale agreement for the economic damages,186 thus necessitating two
settlement agreements. However, a settling defendant may prefer to
make one noncontingent payment to satisfy both types of damages.187
Thus, it appears that the Mary Carter agreement has not only lost its
attractiveness to both plaintiffs and defendants, but has suffered a se-
vere blow to its very survival.188
VI. A PROPOSED MODEL AGREEMENT
In light of the recent changes, forms for sliding scale agreements
need to be adapted to conform with Proposition 51 and Abbott Ford.
As an aid to the practitioner considering the use of a sliding scale
agreement, a proposed model agreement is set forth in the Appendix
of this practicum. Despite the inclusion of a model agreement, the
agreement should always remain flexible and tailored to the client's
need. The model agreement is intended only to make the practi-
tioner aware of the essential provisions that should be included in a
sliding scale agreement.
The introductory paragraph of the model agreement identifies the
parties. When more than one defendant or plaintiff is to be part of
the agreement, a separate agreement should be entered into by
each. 189 Paragraph 1 lists the causes of action which are subject to
the agreement. 9 0 All actions arising from the same occurrence or
event shall be deemed subject to the agreement. Causes of action un-
related to the described event are not part of the action and should
not bar one party from bringing an action against another party.
Paragraph 2 is the heart of the sliding scale agreement. It contains
the terms defining the payment structure of the agreement. In re-
sponse to Proposition 51, the agreement is split into two parts to con-
186. This eliminates the uncertainty of astronomical damages. If a sliding scale
agreement is entered into, the best way to limit potential liability for noneconomic
damages is through a standard settlement agreement.
187. This is probably preferable because the complexity is reduced for the parties.
188. There may be a few limited situations in which a Mary Carter agreement re-
tains its attractiveness. One such case is where noneconomic damages are not sought
or are unlikely to be awarded. However, it is unusual for a personal injury case not to
involve any noneconomic injury. Furthermore, it is difficult to be certain that
noneconomic losses will not be awarded. Nevertheless, in these isolated cases the
Mary Carter agreement may still provide an alternative to defendants.
189. In Abbott Ford, the plaintiffs each entered into a separate sliding scale agree-
ment with the defendant Abbott Ford. Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d
858, 866, 741 P.2d 124, 128, 239 Cal. Rptr. 626, 630 (1987).
190. This can be rather general since there will be a reference to the case number
which in turn will reference the pleadings.
sider noneconomic and economic damages separately.19 1
Noneconomic damages are subject to several liability and thus each
defendant is liable only for his share192 regardless of the solvency of
the other defendants. Although a sliding scale agreement cannot be
used for noneconomic damages, a regular settlement agreement may.
This is optional, but in most cases recommended.1 93
A sliding scale agreement may be used for economic damages. Two
alternatives are provided reflecting two common versions of sliding
scale agreements. 194 Under alternative A, a typical sliding scale
agreement is outlined. The plaintiff receives one guaranteed amount
of recovery regardless of the amount of the actual recovery. Under
alternative B, a "step" sliding scale agreement is used which permits
different guaranteed amounts depending on the amount of actual re-
covery. A party may define as many steps as it desires.195
Paragraph 3 permits a defendant to make a loan advance to the
plaintiff. This is a common practice with Mary Carter agreements.
Generally, the loans are interest free and are deducted from any
amount owed by the settling defendant. If the loan exceeds the
amount the settling defendant owes to the plaintiff, a provision is in-
cluded to set a date for the repayment of the loan.
Paragraph 4 is a valuation section. In compliance with Abbott Ford,
parties must predetermine the value of the settlement agreement
made by the settling defendant. Under section 877 of the California
Civil Procedure Code196 this value or consideration is reduced from
the judgment against the nonsettling defendants. The valuation
should reflect only the sliding scale agreement made for the eco-
nomic damages. Any simultaneous settlement for the defendant's
share of noneconomic damages should not be subject to this
valuation.
Paragraph 5 addresses the good faith requirement as a condition
precedent to the court's determination of effectiveness. Paragraph 6
deals with the effect of the agreement on a subsequent settlement
agreement between the same plaintiff and another defendant.197
191. One commentator "recommended that in all settlement agreements in multi-
party tort litigation, the settlement agreement explicitly state two separate sums: one
for settlement of plaintiff's economic damages and the other for settlement of plain-
tiff's noneconomic damages." Special Issue, supra note 153, at 170.
192. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
195. These provisions are optional. The drafter may include as many of these pro-
visions as are necessary. However, if many of these provisions are included, it is proba-
bly more practical to use the sliding scale under alternative A of this subparagraph.
These provisions may provide some flexibility by allowing a certain payment depend-
ing on a range of recoveries. See supra note 14.
196. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1989).
197. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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Paragraph 7 releases the settling defendant from all liability which
may arise from the events described in paragraph 1. Release of liabil-
ity may take the form of a release, a covenant not to sue, or a cove-
nant not to enforce judgment. Paragraph 7 has no effect on other
parties.198
Paragraph 8 provides that the plaintiff must diligently pursue the
claim. As the plaintiff receives a guaranteed recovery, the plaintiff
may be tempted not to zealously pursue the claim. However, in
many cases the plaintiff will be sufficiently motivated because of sub-
stantial noneconomic damages or the receipt of a recovery greater
than the guaranteed amount.
Paragraph 9 disclaims liability. If the agreement becomes ineffec-
tive because of a subsequent event, the agreement still cannot be ad-
mitted for the purpose of proving liability.
Paragraph 10 includes a hold harmless clause which protects the
settling defendant from any action taken by the plaintiff in violation
of the agreement. Paragraph 11 states that the release or covenant
not to sue in paragraph 7 will not release any defendants.199 Para-
graph 12 provides that the signing parties have entered into the
agreement on the advice of their attorneys and that the parties fully
understand the terms of the agreement. The remaining paragraphs
are self-explanatory and are found in most contracts. The practi-
tioner should add other paragraphs if necessary to suit the client's
needs and to provide additional protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
The viability of Mary Carter agreements is now in serious doubt.
Abbott Ford makes these agreements less attractive, while Proposi-
tion 51 limits their applicability. Consequently, there may be little
reason for a party to choose these agreements over a traditional set-
tlement agreement. Mary Carter agreements have also become more
complex and their application is more uncertain as a result of recent
changes in the law. The end appears near for these agreements in
California. Mary Carter has lost her appeal.
THOMAS M. GROSS
198. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 332-34 (5th ed. 1984).
199. The common law rule provided that a release of one defendant released all
parties. Id. at 332.
APPENDIX
SLIDING SCALE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 20 0
[name of plaintiff], [address], hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Plaintiff", and - [name of defendant],
[address], hereinafter referred to as "Settling Defendant,"
in consideration of the promises made herein, agree as follows:
Nature and Status of Dispute
1. On _, 19__, Plaintiff filed a complaint against settling
Defendant and - [names of other defendants] in the [Mu-
nicipal or Superior] Court (Court) in and for the County of _ Cal-
ifornia, designated as __ [case number], alleging - [generally
describe nature of action] by or on the part of the Settling Defendant
and other defendants who are not a party to this Agreement (Nonset-
tling Defendants).
Sliding Scale Settlement Agreement
2. Plaintiff hereby agrees to settle all [his or her] claims against Set-
tling Defendant that arise from the complaint described in Paragraph
1, in accordance with the following terms:
2.1 Treatment of Noneconomic Damages:
In accordance with Proposition 51, Settling Defendant is solely liable
for [his or her] share of Plaintiff's noneconomic damages.
Noneconomic damages are defined as subjective, non-monetary losses
including, but not limited to pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss
of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation. Plaintiff and
Defendant agree to settle Defendant's share of liability for
noneconomic damages for $-.
2.2 Treatment of Economic Damages:
In accordance with Proposition 51, economic damages are subject to
joint liability. Economic damages are defined as objectively verifiable
monetary losses including medical expenses, loss of earnings, burial
costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement, costs of
obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment and loss of
business or employment opportunities. Judgment as defined in this
section reflects all economic damages awarded to Plaintiff pursuant
200. See California Legal Forms: Transaction Guide 77-202 (Cum. Supp. Mar. 1988).
The model agreement uses Form No. 77.63 for Sliding Scale Settlement Agreements as
a basis for this agreement. Several new paragraphs have been added and some
modified to satisfy Abbott Ford and Proposition 51.
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to the action described in paragraph 1 in which Settling Defendant
has joint liability with all Nonsettling Defendants and is reduced by
the value of the consideration as determined under paragraph 4.
Alternative A
Settling Defendant guarantees a total recovery to Plaintiff of
$ _ ("guarantee amount").
(a) If a judgment is rendered in favor of all Nonsettling Defend-
ants and against Plaintiff, Settling Defendant will pay Plaintiff the
sum of $_ (guarantee amount).
(b) If Plaintiff reaches a settlement with or obtains a judgment
against some or all of the Nonsettling Defendants, and the combined
total of all such settlements or judgments less the value of any con-
sideration determined under paragraph 4 (recovery amount) is less
than $_ (guarantee amount), Settling Defendant will pay Plaintiff
an amount equal to the guarantee amount less the recovery amount.
(c) If Plaintiff reaches a settlement with or obtains a judgment
against some or all of the Nonsettling Defendants, and the combined
total of all such settlements or judgments less the value of any con-
sideration determined under paragraph 4 (recovery amount) is an
amount equal to or in excess of $_ (guarantee amount), Settling
Defendant will pay Plaintiff the sum of $_ (noncontingent
payment).
Alternative B
(a) If a judgment is rendered in favor of all Nonsettling Defend-
ants and against Plaintiff, Settling Defendant will pay Plaintiff the
sum of $__
(b) If Plaintiff reaches a settlement with or obtains a judgment
against some or all of the Nonsettling Defendants, and the combined
total of all such settlements or judgments less the value of any con-
sideration determined under paragraph 4 (recovery amount) is less
than $_ (amount-i), Settling Defendant will pay Plaintiff the sum
of $___.
[If the recovery amount is less than $__ (amount-2), Settling De-
fendant will pay Plaintiff the sum of $.
If the recovery amount is less than $ (amount-3), Settling De-
fendant will pay Plaintiff the sum of $-. . . . If the recovery
amount is less than $__ (amount-n), Settling Defendant will pay
Plaintiff the sum of $ .]
(c) If Plaintiff reaches a settlement with or obtains a judgment
against some or all of the Nonsettling Defendants, and the combined
total of all such settlements or judgments less the value of any con-
sideration determined under paragraph 4 (recovery amount) is an
amount equal to or in excess of $_ , Settling Defendant will pay
Plaintiff the sum of $___ (noncontingent amount).
Advance Payment by Loan
3. Settling Defendant shall advance to Plaintiff the sum of $_ as
a loan, without interest. This loan shall be made contemporaneously
with the execution of this agreement and shall be repaid only in the
event, and to the extent that the amount loaned is greater than the
amount which Plaintiff is ultimately entitled to recover from Settling
Defendant under paragraph 2.
[If amount loaned is less than maximum amount potentially recover-
able under paragraph 2 above, add: any balance due to Plaintiff from
Settling Defendant under the terms of paragraph 2 shall be paid
within __ (e.g., 30) days following the final disposition of Plaintiff's
claims against all Nonsettling Defendants, whether by execution of a
settlement agreement or entry of a final judgment (including any
appeals).]
Value of This Agreement
4. Plaintiff and Settling Defendant agree that the fair valuation of
the sliding scale portion of this agreement covering economic dam-
ages subject to joint liability has a value of $ . Should this value
be determined to be too low or not in good faith then the provisions
under paragraph 5 apply.
Determination of Good Faith as Condition Precedent
5. Plaintiff and Settling Defendant agree that a condition precedent
to the effectiveness of this Agreement shall be that the court speci-
fied in paragraph 1 determine that this Agreement has been entered
into in good faith. __ [Plaintiff or Settling Defendant] shall move
that court for such a determination within - [number] days after ex-
ecution of this Agreement by all parties. The agreement shall be
void if the court finds that the agreement is either (1) not in good
faith pursuant to the court's determination or (2) the valuation under
paragraph 4 is found to be too low.
Fffect of a Subsequent Settlement
6. Plaintiff shall not settle all or any part of this dispute defined
under paragraph 1 in which Settling Defendant is jointly liable for
less than the guarantee amount without the written consent of Set-
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tling Defendant if such settlement will cause Settling Defendant to
bear more than [his or her] proportionate share of the joint damages.
Covenant Not to Enforce Judgment
7. In consideration of the receipt of payments [or guarantee or both]
made under this Agreement by Settling Defendant to Plaintiff, Plain-
tiff covenants and agrees that neither Plaintiff nor any person acting
on Plaintiff's behalf shall at any time take any action at law or in
equity to enforce in any manner any judgment that may subse-
quently be obtained against Settling Defendant in the action de-
scribed in paragraph 1 or in any other action that relates to the
subject matter of the action described in paragraph 1.
Pursuit of Claim Against Nonsettling Defendants
8. Plaintiff agrees to pursue the action described in paragraph 1
with due diligence, and shall use all legitimate and reasonable means
to collect any judgment obtained against Nonsettling Defendants.
Disclaimer of Liability
9. This agreement shall not constitute an admission of liability by
Settling Defendant.
Hold Harmless Agreement
10. Plaintiff agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Settling De-
fendant against any loss, costs, damages, or liability, including court
costs and attorneys' fees incurred on account of any action taken by
Plaintiff in violation of this Agreement.
Effect on Nonsettling Defendants
11. Plaintiff and Settling Defendant agree that this Agreement is
not intended as, and shall not be deemed to be, a release of any cause
of action that Plaintiff has against any Nonsettling Defendant arising
out of the facts and incidents involved in the action described in para-
graph 1. Plaintiff and Settling Defendant expressly acknowledge
that Nonsettling Defendants are not parties to this Agreement and
that this Agreement is not intended to benefit Nonsettling Defend-
ants in any manner.
Advice of Attorney
12. (a) Each party warrants and represents that in executing this
agreement, [he or she] has relied upon legal advice from the attorney
of [his or her] choice, that the terms of this Agreement and its conse-
quences have been read and completely explained to [him or her] by
that attorney, and that [he or she] fully understands the terms of this
Agreement.
(b) Each party further acknowledges and represents that, in exe-
cuting this release, [he or she] has not relied on any inducements,
promises, or representations made by the other party or any party
representing or serving [him or her].
Conditions of Execution
13. Each party acknowledges and warrants that [his or her] execu-
tion of this release is free and voluntary.
Execution of Other Documents
14. Each party to this Agreement shall cooperate fully in the execu-
tion of any and all other documents and in the completion of any ad-
ditional actions that may be necessary or appropriate to give full
force and effect to the terms and intent of this Agreement.
Attorney's Fees
15. Each party shall bear all attorney's fees and costs arising from
that party's own counsel in connection with the complaint, this
Agreement, the matters referred to herein, and all related matters.
Except to the extent provided in paragraph 10, this provision shall be
applicable to this entire Agreement.
Entire Agreement
16. This agreement contains the entire agreement between the
parties.
Effective Date
17. This Agreement shall become effective immediately upon execu-
tion by the parties.
Governing Law
18. This agreement is entered into, and shall be construed and inter-
preted in accordance with, the laws of the State of California.
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Settling Defendant
[signature of Settling Defendant]
[typed name]

